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Home Foreclosures and Neighborhood 
Crime Dynamics 
Sonya Williams, George Galster, and Nandita Verma 
Abstract   We advance scholarship related to home foreclosures and 
neighborhood crime by employing Granger causality tests and multilevel growth 
modeling with annual data from Chicago neighborhoods over the 1998-2009 
period.  We find that completed foreclosures temporally lead property crime and 
not vice versa.  More completed foreclosures during a year both increase the 
level of property crime and slow its decline subsequently.  This relationship is 
strongest in higher-income, predominantly renter-occupied neighborhoods, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom.  We did not find unambiguous, uni-
directional causation in the case of violent crime and when filed foreclosures 
were analyzed. 
Keywords   foreclosures, crime, neighborhoods, Granger causality, 
multilevel growth models 
Author Affiliations  Sonya Williams and Nandita Verma, MDRC; George 
Galster, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Wayne State University;.  
Background 
The last half-decade has witnessed a record-number of home foreclosures 
in America, as risky mortgage underwriting practices and deteriorating 
employment prospects have wreaked havoc (Immergluck, 2011).  
Although many of these foreclosed homes have been resold, an estimated 
644 thousand remain vacant nationwide at this writing.  Even more 
sobering, an additional 711 thousand properties appear to be headed into 
foreclosure soon (Saulny, 2012). 
The financial and psychological impacts of foreclosure upon 
individual owners and occupying households are not to be minimized.  
The impacts of concentrated foreclosures on neighborhoods have also 
proven devastating, however (Kingsley, Smith and Price 2009).  As 
illustration, Immergluck and Smith (2006a) found in Chicago that every 
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additional foreclosure within an eighth of a mile reduced a home’s value 
by 0.9%; in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods the marginal 
impact was twice as large: 1.8%.  Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) 
analyzed patterns in 13 states and 7 metro areas and estimated a 1.0% 
negative impact on housing sales prices resulting from each additional 
foreclosure within 300 feet, and roughly half that amount for foreclosures 
within 300-500 feet.  If these estimates are even approximately correct, 
they imply that American neighborhoods have lost hundreds of billions of 
dollars in home equity purely from the negative externalities associated 
with home foreclosures over the last several years (Kingsley, Smith and 
Price 2009). 
There are several likely mechanisms through which foreclosures get 
capitalized into lower proximate property values: visible under-
maintenance of the vacant structure and grounds; health hazards 
associated with increased risks of fire and vermin infestations; 
unauthorized occupancy; and crime.  We focus on the last factor in this 
paper.  Foreclosures may spur crime nearby both directly and indirectly; 
for fuller discussions, see Immergluck and Smith (2006b); Taylor (2009); 
Katz, Wallace and Hedberg (2011); and Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin (2013).  
Directly, vacant properties may provide attractive venues for criminals to 
hide and/or commit their illegal acts, as well as structures that are 
vulnerable to plunder (Raleigh and Galster, 2012).  Loss of residents in the 
formerly inhabited dwellings means fewer “capable guardians” of the 
neighborhood (Taylor, 2009).  Indirectly, visible disrepair and physical 
disorder around foreclosed properties can signal to potential lawbreakers 
an erosion of social control and collective efficacy in the neighborhood 
(Skogan 1990).  Both directly and indirectly, foreclosures likely spur crime 
because of perceived-lower chances of apprehension on the part of 
potential criminals (Goodstein and Lee 2010; Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin 
2013). 
What is less clear is whether temporal sequences and dominant 
causal processes differ between violent and property crimes and 
according to neighborhood context.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to make 
definitive a priori predictions in these regards based on extant theory. 
If the prime mechanism connecting foreclosures and property crime 
were that a dwelling is made vulnerable for burglary, one would predict 
that the relationship would wane soon after the vacancy occurs as 
valuables are quickly stripped from the property (Katz, Wallace and 
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Hedberg, 2011).  On the other hand, if the prime mechanism were 
signaling disorder and weak collective efficacy, the impact on property 
crime could last a considerable period, conceivably until the dwelling is 
re-occupied.  There may be less potential temporal variation in the 
response of violent crime, inasmuch as the main mechanisms may involve 
the venue and signaling effects of vacant properties. 
By contrast, there is a conventionally accepted notion that 
foreclosures will have a more powerful crime-producing impact in weaker, 
more disadvantaged neighborhoods (Katz, Wallace and Hedberg, 2011).  
Because they have many disamenities it may take an extended period 
before foreclosed properties will be reoccupied (Immergluck and Smith, 
2006b).  Collective efficacy in such neighborhoods may be poised at a 
minimum threshold because they have relatively few homeowners to 
begin with.  The loss of homeowners through foreclosure may be 
sufficient to tip the place into a crime upsurge.  This upsurge may be 
unchecked if the disadvantaged area suffered from chronically lackluster 
police protection due to its lack of political clout (Taylor, 2009).  This 
proposition has not been tested empirically, however, to our knowledge. 
In an effort to probe these complex, often hard-to-predict patterns, 
we investigate the home foreclosures-neighborhood crime relationship in 
an innovative way that employs Granger causality and multilevel growth 
model techniques.  Specifically, we analyze in a dynamic framework 
annual single-family home foreclosure and crime data in Chicago 
neighborhoods over the 1998-2009 period.  We find that completed 
foreclosures temporally lead property crime and not vice versa, though 
such is not the case for violent crime.  More completed foreclosures during 
a prior year both substantially increase the level of neighborhood property 
crime and slow its decline subsequently.  Neighborhood characteristics 
moderate this relationship, however, in a manner contrary to the 
conventional wisdom. 
Foreclosures, Crime and Neighborhood Dynamics: Past 
Research and a New Approach 
Drawing causal conclusions from empirical analyses of the home 
foreclosure / crime relationship is complicated for two fundamental 
reasons: endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity.  First, there are 
equally plausible reasons that causation runs in the opposite way than is 
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popularly conceived.  Absentee landlords in neighborhoods with rising 
crime rates (perhaps having nothing to do with foreclosures) will likely be 
faced with falling property values and skyrocketing vacancies as demand 
for their neighborhoods withers (Hipp, Tita and Greenbaum, 2009; Hipp 
2010).  They may respond by reducing upkeep, withholding property tax 
payments and, in extreme cases, defaulting on their mortgages.  
Analogously, owner-occupants in such rising-crime neighborhoods may 
find themselves “under water” if their property values fall below 
outstanding mortgage balances.  They, too, may choose to exercise their 
option of default.  Thus, positive associations between trends in 
neighborhood crime and foreclosure rates may be indicative of the former 
causing the latter, not vice versa. 
The second complication is that the observed foreclosure / crime 
relationship may be spurious due to heterogeneous, unobservable 
neighborhood characteristics.  It is likely that several characteristics of a 
neighborhood—the location of properties vis-a-vis the street, access to 
mass transit, the presence and design of public spaces and facilities—will 
independently affect both how many foreclosures and how much crime 
will be observed there.  These idiosyncratic features may shape the 
attractiveness and prospective quality of residential life of the 
neighborhood from the perspective of household demanders, and for 
entirely different reasons influence crime rates, such as through the built 
environment’s impact on routine activity patterns and “defensible spaces.”  
To the extent that these neighborhood features are heterogeneously 
distributed and unobserved (i.e., uncontrolled statistically) they can create 
omitted variable bias producing in the extreme an apparent correlation 
between foreclosure concentrations and crime rates that is wholly 
spurious.  
In the pages of this journal, Immergluck and Smith (2006b) were the 
first to tackle these challenges with a multivariate quantitative analysis.  
They explored the cross-sectional relationship between the annual rate of 
foreclosed single-family properties in a census tract in Chicago and crime 
rates there during 2001, controlling for a host of 2000 demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population that might be expected to 
be related to crime.  They found that tracts with a one percentage point-
higher 2001 rate of foreclosures had a 2% higher 2001 violent crime rate, 
all else equal, though the relationships for property crime and total crime 
rates were not statistically significant. They employed a Hausman test to 
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ascertain if endogeneity bias was present and concluded it was not.1 
Potential selection bias was not considered. The path-breaking efforts of 
Immergluck and Smith (2006b) led to a host of recent, increasingly 
sophisticated econometric studies of this phenomenon. 
Goodstein and Lee (2010) analyzed a U.S.-wide panel of annual 
county data from 2002-2007, employing instrumental variables to deal 
with potential endogeneity bias and fixed-effects to deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity.  They found that counties with a one percentage point-
higher annual rate of foreclosures would be expected to have a 10% higher 
annual burglary rate in the following year, all else equal.  In addition, 
foreclosures evinced some positive associations with larceny and assault 
rates, though the relationships were sensitive to the precise panel 
employed.  Robbery, auto theft, rape and murder were not associated with 
foreclosures.  Unfortunately, the large geographic scale at which the 
relationships were measured in this study is problematic, since the causal 
processes operating behind the foreclosure - crime relationship are likely 
varying at a finer-grained spatial level within a county. 
Cui (2010) attempted to overcome this shortcoming with quarterly, 
block face data from Pittsburgh.  Cui employed geo-coding of point-data 
to match proximate foreclosures and crimes for the 2006-2009 period.  For 
each foreclosure she identified crimes within a 250-foot radius and those 
within an equal-area concentric ring from 251-353 feet (and not within 250 
feet of another foreclosure), arguing that these constituted treatment and 
control groups.  To overcome both endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity, Cui executed a difference-in-differences regression model 
wherein pre- and post-foreclosure differences in crimes across treatment 
and control areas were compared.  Cui concluded that quarterly violent 
crime rates were 15% higher within 250 feet of a foreclosed and vacant 
property than in comparable areas less proximate.  It was only when a 
foreclosed property became vacant, however, that the negative impact 
transpired.  The magnitude of this relationship with property crimes was 
similar but not as statistically significant.  Unfortunately, Cui deemed 
areas with high concentrations of foreclosures unsuitable for either 
treatment and control areas, so they were omitted from the analysis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  However, when Cui (2010) replicates a cross-sectional model like Immergluck and 
Smith’s she finds a variety of implausible relationships.  Moreover, she finds that crime 
rate strongly predicts foreclosures three years later, suggesting that endogeneity is 
indeed worrisome. 
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Moreover, the implicit assumption that proximity variations within 250 
feet make no difference and are unrelated to block face conditions is 
questionable. 
Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin (2013) also employed point-level, 
quarterly crime and foreclosure data to examine relationships in New 
York City during 2004-2008.  Like Cui (2010), they utilized a difference-in-
differences estimation strategy comparing block face crime levels before 
and after foreclosures occurred to analogous changes in others in the same 
police precinct without foreclosures.  They included both block face fixed 
effects and police precinct-quarter fixed effects to surmount issues of 
unobserved heterogeneity.  They further tested for endogeneity by 
ascertaining if future foreclosures over the next six quarters predicted 
crime in the current quarter, which it did not.  Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin 
found that in their preferred specification that a marginal increase in 
foreclosures resulted in 3% more total crimes, almost 6% more violent 
crimes, and 3% more public nuisance crimes (but not more property 
crimes) on the block face in the subsequent quarter.  This relationship 
seemed to appertain primarily after a threshold of two foreclosures on the 
block face was surpassed, however.  Moreover, it appeared that crime was 
not merely relocated from other parts of the precinct to block faces with 
more foreclosures, and instead represented a net increase.  Like Cui (2010), 
they found that it was the period after which a foreclosed home became 
vacant when crime impacts were manifested. 
Katz, Wallace and Hedberg (2011) explored the finely grained timing 
of foreclosure-crime relationships using monthly 2003-2008 data 
aggregated to census blocks in Glendale, AZ.  They estimated a random-
effects model of the monthly crime rate in the block as a function of the 
contemporaneous and three prior monthly lagged values of foreclosure 
rates, demographic and land use control variables, and a quadratic in time.  
Their model revealed that for every additional foreclosure there was a 
cumulative impact of 12 more property crimes and 3 more violent crimes 
(per thousand population), though their random effects showed 
considerable variation in this impact across blocks (especially for property 
and total crime rates).  They concluded that foreclosures caused an 
immediate flux followed by a brief increase in crime—no more than four 
months for drug crimes and three months for other categories.  However, 
it is unclear the degree to which these estimates are influenced by 
endogeneity bias, though the lag specification offers some confidence in 
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this regard. 
In sum, the recent spate of sophisticated econometric analyses have 
come to a remarkable degree of consensus that home foreclosures during 
the first decade of the twenty-first century in U.S. urban neighborhoods 
indeed lead to more crime (of one sort or another) nearby.  This 
conclusion appears robust to the scale of neighborhood or time period 
over which data are observed, and holds when a variety of techniques are 
employed to minimize the potentially biasing influences of endogeneity 
and unobserved heterogeneity. 
The research we report in this paper offers an explicit temporal, 
dynamic focus on the topic, thereby advancing from this foundational 
work above in several ways.  First, we explore the issue of endogeneity by 
employing adapted Granger causality tests to ascertain if crime does, 
indeed, temporally lag foreclosures and not vice versa. 2  Second, after 
establishing a plausible causal sequence from the prior step, we estimate 
with a multilevel growth model how foreclosures affect the trajectory (as 
well as level) of neighborhood crime, employing random effects to deal 
with unobserved heterogeneity.  Third, we investigate the degree to which 
the prior relationships are sensitive to neighborhood groups distinguished 
by housing market strength.   
Our paper is organized as follows.  We begin describing the sources 
and nature of our longitudinal data for the city of Chicago, how we 
standardized and adjusted indicators, and our cluster analysis employed 
to ascertain neighborhood groups in Chicago.  Second, we provide a 
portrait of trends in foreclosures and crime in Chicago during our analysis 
period, both overall and by group.  Third, we present our adapted 
Granger causality tests that ultimately demonstrate that completed 
foreclosures lead property crime temporally.  Fourth, we describe our 
multilevel growth model and present its estimated parameters indicating 
that more foreclosures lead both to an elevated initial level of property 
crime and its slower reduction over time.  We also demonstrate how the 
foregoing multilevel growth model results are sensitive to neighborhood 
context.  We offer conclusions, caveats and implications in the final section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Cui (2010) and Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin (2011) explore the causality issue in a 
conceptually similar way by testing if the temporal leading value of foreclosures predicts 
crime. 
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Data and Measures 
Geographic Unit of Analysis 
In 2003, the MacArthur Foundation of Chicago funded an ambitious 
initiative to improve conditions in distressed urban neighborhoods: the 
New Community Program (NCP).  A 10-year, $47 million effort, NCP is a 
comprehensive effort to engage community-based groups to attack 
multiple problems simultaneously — in education, workforce 
development, housing, social services, and public policy.  Managed by the 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC/Chicago), NCP 
focuses its efforts on 14 neighborhood areas in Chicago with varying 
challenges.  Inasmuch as the research reported here was completed as part 
of a larger evaluation of NCP, we collected data corresponding to the 
geographies of the 14 NCP neighborhoods, plus the remaining 66 
Community Areas specified by the City of Chicago.3 We emphasize that 
although these geographic units are relatively large (typically several 
census tracts), they have longstanding social meaning in Chicago. 
In this study we use data provided by the Metro Chicago 
Information Center.  MCIC obtained data from a variety of secondary 
sources, transformed them to create counts and sums for the Census tracts 
within Chicago, aggregated them to create measures at we hereafter call 
the “neighborhood” level, and then standardized them to adjust for 
different neighborhood population sizes.4 
Neighborhood Groups 
We wish to examine potential variations in foreclosure-crime dynamics 
across different neighborhood contexts.  To accomplish this categorization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A map showing these 80 neighborhoods is available from the authors.  Note that some 
of the traditional 77 Community Areas of Chicago were split for our analysis because 
parts were outside NCP boundaries.  With these few exceptions, our 80 neighborhoods 
follow the encompassing boundaries of their constituent census tracts.	  4	  The Census tract designations used for these transformations are the definitions created 
after the 2000 Decennial Census; data collected or assembled using earlier designations 
was transformed to the 2000-era designations using the relational matrices published by 
the US Census Bureau. For most of the neighborhoods, the definitional boundaries align 
with tract boundaries such that the neighborhood-level measure is the aggregation of the 
tract-level measure.  In cases where this is not true, the tract values were apportioned 
between multiple neighborhoods based on the distribution of the tract’s population 
between the multiple neighborhoods.	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of contexts in a meaningful, multi-dimensional way we undertook a 
cluster analysis of the 80 aforementioned Chicago neighborhoods, based 
on a large number of indicators conceptually related to the “market 
strength” of the area; see Appendix Table A1.  These indicators measured 
both 2000 levels of and pre-2000 changes in indicators of: median income, 
racial ethnic composition, mortgage market activity and housing stock 
characteristics.  We applied several clustering algorithms and found that 
they all led us to specify a five-fold typology5 
Chicago Neighborhood Groups 
Group I Moderate income, predominately black residents; housing is 
mostly owner-occupied, single-family units 
Group II Moderate income, predominately white residents – about 
one quarter of whom are foreign-born; with a mix of single-family and 
multi-unit owner-occupied dwellings 
Group III Moderate income, predominantly Hispanic residents – 
almost 40% are foreign-born; housing is mostly smaller multi-unit 
dwellings, split between owner-occupiers and renters 
Group IV Low income; variety of racial and ethnic predominance; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Cluster analysis was used to create the neighborhood grouping used in this paper. This 
technique is widely used to sort cases (people, things, events, neighborhoods, and so on) 
into groups, or clusters, so that the degree of association is stronger among members of 
the same cluster and weaker among members of different clusters.  The procedure was 
applied to classify all Chicago neighborhoods, and more than 20 variables were used to 
group these neighborhoods, including measures of economic context, housing market 
dynamics, and racial/ethnic diversity of neighborhoods; see Appendix Table A1. These 
measures were assembled for the period 2000-2005, in order to capture the “starting 
context” for the NCP initiative.  In general, a good cluster solution is one in which each 
cluster is very different from other clusters (“between-cluster heterogeneity”) and in 
which units in each cluster are as similar as possible (“within-cluster homogeneity”). We 
used the Ward clustering method. The statistical diagnostics available for cluster analysis 
were calculated and examined, and they confirm that the resulting five clusters of 
neighborhoods largely differ from one another. In addition, tests were conducted to 
assess the “goodness of fit” of neighborhoods with their groups (including an 
examination of the extent to which neighborhoods differ from their cluster, on average, 
as well as sensitivity tests comparing findings before and after the exclusion of a 
potentially “outlier” neighborhood). These tests provide further confidence in the five 
clusters.	  
  Sonya Williams, et al. 
DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2014 11  
housing is mostly renter-occupied, large multi-unit dwellings 
Group V High income; variety of racial and ethnic predominance; 
housing is mostly large multi-unit dwellings, with more renters than 
owners 
The neighborhood groups are primarily distinguished by the income 
and race/ethnicity of the neighborhood residents; descriptive statistics for 
the five neighborhood groups are presented in Appendix Table 1.  For 
example, Chicago neighborhoods where the average (mean) household 
income is around the city average (i.e., middle and working class 
neighborhoods) are split by race/ethnicity between three groups.  
Neighborhoods with predominantly black residents are in Group I, those 
with predominantly white residents are in Group II, and neighborhoods 
where a large proportion of the residents are Hispanic are in Group III.  
The other two groups contain the neighborhoods where the average 
incomes are below (Group IV) and above (Group V) the city average.  The 
neighborhoods in Groups IV and V have a wider variety of racial and 
ethnic compositions compared to the first three groups. 
The neighborhoods in the five groups also differ in terms of their 
housing configuration.  Two of the moderate income groups — 
neighborhoods with predominantly black residents (Group I) and those 
with predominantly white residents (Group II) — consist of mostly 
owner-occupied housing.  Most of the residences in the Group I 
neighborhoods are single-family dwelling units, while those in Group II 
are a mix of single-family and large, (five or more) multi-unit buildings.  
The other moderate income group, neighborhoods with a considerable 
proportion of Hispanic residents (Group III), is split between rental and 
owner-occupied housing, the majority of which are small, (two to four) 
multi-unit buildings.  Finally, the low income (Group IV) and high income 
(Group V) neighborhood groups have similar housing configurations — 
large, multi-unit buildings where the majority of residents are renters. 
Each group of neighborhoods is somewhat spatially contiguous; see 
Map 1.  The high income neighborhoods (Group V) are clustered around 
the central business district of the city (known as the Loop) — this 
neighborhood group includes all of Central Chicago as well as North Side 
and West Side neighborhoods that border Chicago’s downtown.  The low 
income neighborhoods (Group IV) are mostly in Chicago’s South Side, 
although a few are in the West Side.  The spatial distribution of the 
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moderate income neighborhood groups reflects the historical racial 
distribution of Chicago, with the neighborhoods having a predominately 
white population (Group II) in the North Side, those with predominately 
black populations (Group I) in the South Side, and those with a relatively 
high concentration of Hispanics (Group III) in the West Side.  
 
 
 
Map 1. Chicago Neighborhood Groups Produced by Cluster Analysis 
 
 
 
The five neighborhood group classification is used to represent 
neighborhood context in the analyses presented here.  These groups 
reflect multidimensional differences in important neighborhood 
characteristics that we believe distinguish contexts according to strength 
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of local housing market and other aspects that are likely to influence the 
magnitude of the foreclosure-crime relationship. 
Foreclosure Data 
Counts of filed and completed foreclosures on single-family homes for the 
years 1998 to 2009 originated from administrative records kept by the 
Cook County Circuit Clerk’s Office.  Foreclosure filings count properties 
where a complaint has been filed against the homeowner requesting that 
foreclosure proceedings be initiated.  Foreclosure completions count of the 
number of forecloses whose resolution was an auction of the property in 
question (foreclosure filings that are resolved in other ways are not 
classified as completed). 6  Both counts were aggregated to the 
neighborhood level, summed for the calendar year, and standardized by 
the number of single-family, owner-occupied dwellings, in 10,000s.  
Unfortunately, neither filed or completed foreclosure indicators give 
a precise estimate of when a foreclosed property becomes vacant and then 
(possibly) is occupied again.  But, because these indicators likely bracket 
the desired figure, we conducted our analyses in parallel using both. 
Crime Data 
Data originate from crimes reported by the Chicago Police Department for 
the period 1991 to 2009, classified using the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) 
typology.  Each record reflects a police report of an incident, which may 
include multiple crimes.7 MCIC geo-coded these reports, aggregated them 
to the neighborhood level, summed them for the calendar year, then 
standardized them across neighborhoods by dividing by 2000 population 
in 10,000s.  Crimes were divided into two types: property (arson, auto 
theft, burglary, and larceny-theft) and violent (assault, murder, rape, and 
robbery).  Geographic variations in these crime rates across Chicago 
neighborhoods are portrayed in Maps 2 and 3. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Both filed and completions data exclude ownership transfers that occur as the result of 
financial distress (short sales or deed-in-lieu-of-foreclosure transactions).	  7	  With multiple incidents the report is classified in the UCR category of the most serious 
crime (generally, the crime with the highest potential penalty).  Note that these are police 
reports and do not reflect later adjudication of the incident (e.g., an assault recorded on 
the initial report as a criminal act later adjudicated as justifiable self-defense is still 
included).	  
Foreclosures and Neighborhood Crime  
14  Post-Print, Housing Studies 29(3), 2014 
 
 
 
Map 2. Chicago Property Crime Rates, 2003 [Note: Property crime rate is number of 
reported crimes per 10,000 population.] 
 
 
 
Quartile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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Map 3. Chicago Violent Crime Rates, 2003  
 
 
 
We recognize that these data have shortcomings.  As they originate 
from police reports, unreported crimes are not included and the 
underreporting rate may not be constant across neighborhoods, 
depending on the crime (Baumer, 2002; Goudriaan, Wittebrood and 
Nieubeerta, 2006).  We could only obtain annual crime counts aggregated 
to the neighborhood. 
 
Quartile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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Other Data 
Population, income and housing unit data were extracted from the 2000 
Census summary file 3 tabulations.  Data regarding home purchase loans 
for owner-occupied homes in one- to four-unit dwellings (number of loans 
issued, aggregate amount of lending, and median loan amount; the former 
two standardized by single-family, owner-occupied dwellings) was 
tabulated from annual Home Mortgage Disclosure Act documents 1998-
2009.  Commercial land area was obtained from an aerial survey 
commissioned by the Chicago Metropolitan Agency on Planning in 2000.   
LOESS Curves 
One issue pertinent to the visual display of trends for indicators such as 
the ones used here is the level of volatility in the data.  As our unit of 
analysis represents a fairly high level of aggregation compared to the 
original scale of measurement, the effect of random fluctuations and other 
noise-inducing events can be magnified.  This may lead to inappropriate 
emphasis on points with high levels of variation and increased difficulty 
in identifying the overall course of the trend.  Thus, we used smoothing 
techniques to prepare the trend charts shown below.  Specifically, the 
trend charts show the actual indicator values (represented by small 
circles) superimposed upon a curve which represents the results of a local, 
non-parametric regression technique (LOESS).  At each point of the trend, 
a low-degree polynomial is fit to a subset of the entire set of data 
consisting of those points nearest to the point in question (i.e., its 
neighbors).  The polynomial is fit using a weighted regression procedure, 
giving higher weight to points that are close neighbors and lower weights 
to those that are further away.8 
Recent Trends in Foreclosures and Crime in Chicago  
As can be seen in Figure 1 and Table 1, both property and violent 
crime rates have declined in Chicago since the early 1990s, following the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  While the LOESS function is parametric within a single “neighborhood” of the data, the 
overall function — the compilation of the local regression results for each point — fit to 
the trend is non-parametric.  Weighted moving averages are a simple example of a 
LOESS function, where the local polynomial regression function has a degree of 0.  For 
the LOESS functions estimated for the indicators, a higher degree polynomial was used 
so that shifts in trend direction would be more readily identified.	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national trend.  The decline was not uniform across the city’s 
neighborhoods, however, with generally greater declines in crime for 
neighborhoods with initially higher levels of crime.  Specifically, the crime 
rates for the neighborhoods with the highest amount of crime declined at 
a higher rate, relative to other neighborhoods.  An exception to this is the 
moderate income neighborhoods with a predominately black population 
(Group I), who on average had crime rates above the city rates.  While the 
difference between the city rates and the neighborhood rates was not as 
great for the Group I neighborhoods compared with the other higher-
crime areas, the rate of decline in the crime rates for the neighborhoods in 
this group was much slower compared with the other neighborhoods and 
the city as a whole. 
 
 
Figure 1. Property and Violent Crime Reports per 10,000 Persons, Chicago Total and by 
Neighborhood Group, 1991-2009. [Source: Authors’ analysis of data assembled by 
Metro Chicago Information Center. Notes: Table values are the annual rate and 
percentage change averaged across neighborhoods as indicated in the column labels.  
Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.] 
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Table 1. Crime and Foreclosures in Chicago: Neighborhood Annual Average Rate and 
Percentage Change, by Group, 1998-2009 
 
Characteristic All I II III IV V 
Violent Crime per 10,000 population 
Annual Rate 
168.90 235.30 55.30 104.60 323.70 135.70 
-137.00 -61.20 -33.60 -49.30 -147.20 -83.60 
Annual Percentage 
change 
-3.96 -2.33 -3.49 -2.35 -5.98 -6.01 
-2.77 -0.69 -2.76 -2.61 -2.42 -1.94 
Property Crime per 10,000 population 
Annual Rate 
546.30 590.20 302.50 406.60 666.90 1166.90 
-413.20 -127.70 -93.70 -105.50 -242.00 -978.80 
Annual Percentage 
change 
-3.35 -2.05 -3.24 -3.09 -4.21 -4.10 
-1.45 -0.67 -1.43 -0.88 -1.66 -1.02 
Filed Foreclosures per 10,000 single family housing units 
Annual Rate 
364.40 390.80 122.90 269.40 798.50 138.90 
-392.90 -108.60 -61.60 -199.10 -544.70 -87.30 
Annual Percentage 
change 
4.26 3.31 10.65 12.90 -3.86 -9.31 
-11.73 -2.15 -10.67 -10.08 -6.57 -12.27 
Completed Foreclosures per 10,000 single family housing units 
Annual Rate 
229.20 247.30 56.50 139.30 561.90 54.30 
-296.90 -84.90 -40.90 -154.00 -410.10 -36.60 
Annual Percentage 
change 
-2.32 -2.70 2.51 4.52 -8.34 -13.97 
-10.73 -1.34 -11.52 -9.33 -5.97 -12.26 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center. Notes: Table values are 
the annual rate and percentage change averaged across neighborhoods as indicated in the column labels.  
Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis. 
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As can be seen in Figure 2 and Table 1, Chicago’s rate for both filed 
and completed foreclosures has radically changed direction over time, 
with the last peak occurring during the previous recession in the early 
2000s.  After falling for several years, the filed foreclosure rate began 
rising again in 2006; the completed foreclosure rate also began increasing 
shortly thereafter but has yet to catch-up to the filed foreclosure rate.  The 
low income neighborhoods (Group IV) have been the hardest hit by 
foreclosures, both currently and during past upsurges; see Map 4.  While 
the level of foreclosures is not as high, the moderate income 
neighborhoods with predominately black residents (Group I) have also 
historically been disproportionately affected by foreclosures; in fact, for 
these neighborhoods, the rate of filed foreclosures did not appreciably 
decline after the early 2000s recession.  The neighborhoods in these two 
groups, along with the moderate income neighborhoods with 
concentrations of Hispanic residents (Group III), have the largest 
divergence between their filed and completed foreclosures in recent years; 
this suggests that many of these foreclosures are related to sub-prime 
mortgages.  Neighborhoods in the other groups (II and V) generally have 
lower rates of foreclosures, particularly having only very small trend 
responses to the previous recession.  While the filed and completed 
foreclosure rates in the high income neighborhoods (Group V) have 
remained close in both size and trend, the filed foreclosure rate has begun 
to outpace the completed foreclosure rate in the moderate income 
neighborhoods with predominately white residents (Group II), possibly in 
response to the duration of the post-housing market collapse recession. 
In sum, the portraits of both crime and foreclosure trajectories in 
Chicago evince substantial variation across neighborhood types.  This 
suggests that both neighborhood context (as captured by the 
neighborhood groups) and unique characteristics of neighborhoods 
influence an indicator’s trajectory.  Moreover, it suggests that contextual 
factors should be considered when assessing the foreclosure-crime 
relationship, which we do in the last section of this paper.  [Further details 
of the annual crime and foreclosure data are provided in Appendix Table 
2.] 	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Figure 2. Filed and Completed Foreclosures per 10,000 Owner-Occupied Single Family 
Housing Units, Chicago Total and by Neighborhood Group, 1998-2009. [Source: Authors’ 
analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center. Notes: The plotted line 
for each indicator is smoothed using a nonparametric locally weighted regression 
technique known as LOESS. See text for further information.] 
 	   	  
  Sonya Williams, et al. 
DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2014 21  
 
 
Map 1. Chicago Completed Foreclosure Rates, 2003. [Note: Completed foreclosures 
rate is the number of completed foreclosures of single-family properties per 10,000 
single-family owner occupied homes.] 
 
 
Do Foreclosures Lead or Lag Crime? Granger Causality 
Tests 
Analysis Method 
Now that we have examined the trends in crime and foreclosures in a 
descriptive fashion for Chicago and its five neighborhood groups, we 
address the analytical question of whether at the individual neighborhood 
Quartile None Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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level there is any distinct temporal sequence in these indicators.  We do so 
by employing a variant of Granger causality test.  Granger Causality 
describes a particular statistical relationship that can exist between two 
time series.9 Formally, a time series X may be said to “cause” another time 
series Y if and only if the expectation of Y given the history of X is 
different from the unconditional expectation of Y: 𝐸 𝑌 𝑌!!! ,𝑋!!! ≠ 𝐸(𝑌|𝑌!!!) 
where t indexes time and t-k indexes some number of lags (previous 
values) of Y (i.e., Yt-1, Yt-2, etc.)  Since X can only change the expected 
value of Y if there is a statistical relationship between the two time series, 
the test of a Granger Causal relationship can be structured as a test of 
whether the fit of the model of Y improves when X is added as a predictor. 
We test for Granger Causality by assessing the joint significance tests 
of the estimated coefficients for the candidate predictor. First, an 
autodependence model of the outcome is estimated: 𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +   …   + 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝜀! 
where k is the number of lags used to account for the dependence of 
values of the outcome in one period on its value in past periods.10 A 
second model, including the candidate predictor, is then estimated: 𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑌!!! +   …   + 𝛽!𝑌!!! + 𝛾!𝑋!!! + 𝛾!𝑋!!! + 𝜀! 
If the γ parameters are jointly significant, this provides evidence of the 
existence of a Granger Causal relationship between X and Y.11  We use k=2 
for our analyses, given the relatively short panel of annual observations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The use of the causal in the name of the test and throughout this section is a reference to 
the particular statistical relationship, not to be mistaken for conceptual causality and/or 
causal mechanisms.	  10	  The value of k is not determined empirically as Granger Causality is a “brute force” 
method.  Generally, the value of k is set high enough to ensure that the autodependence 
of the outcome is accounted for within the limits of the input data	  
11 Note that the Granger Causality test relies on overfitting to ensure that all 
autodependence is removed from the data.  This overfitting is harmless in regards to bias, 
meaning that it does not imperil the validity of the statistical significance tests.  However, 
overfitting causes estimator inefficiency and so results in uninformative coefficient 
estimates.  In other words, Granger Causality tests whether there is a relationship (i.e., its 
existence) but is uninformative in regards to the strength or direction of effects of X on Y. 
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from 1998-2009.12 
A further adaptation of the Granger Causality test is necessary when 
the input data concern multiple geographic units, as is the case here.  
Recall that the models specified above include a single error term, εt, 
which accounts for random disturbance associated with individual time 
periods.  Since the data used here include multiple units, random 
disturbances associated with the individual units must also be accounted 
for in the model specification.  Thus, the models specified to conduct the 
Granger Causality tests reported on here include two-way random effects 
(i.e., εt and εi, where i indexes neighborhoods) to account for the structure 
in the error term. 
Our focus here is on identification of time-shifted (asynchronous) 
associations or lead/lag relationships between foreclosure and crime rates.  
Thus, we assess Granger Causality using each indicator as the outcome.  
That is, using the notation from above, we tests whether X causes Y and 
whether Y causes X.  There are four possible outcomes, as follows (where 
an arrow signifies Granger causality): 
1. 𝑋 → 𝑌;𝑌 ↛ 𝑋 
2. 𝑋 ↛ 𝑌;𝑌 → 𝑋 
3. 𝑋 → 𝑌;𝑌 → 𝑋 (or𝑋 ↔ 𝑌) 
4. 𝑋 ↛ 𝑌;𝑌 ↛ 𝑋 
Interpretation is straightforward for three of these cases.  For 
outcomes 1 and 2, X leads Y or vice versa, while for outcome 4, the null 
hypothesis of no time-shifted relationship cannot be rejected.  
Interpretation of the third outcome is less determinable: X and Y each 
cause the other, which may be due to a feedback loop, the influence of a 
third, unaccounted for variable, or something else.   
Thus, this modeling strategy allows identification of time-shifted 
relationships between multiple variables, including identification of 
situations where lead-lag relationships between two indicators are 
complimentary (outcome 4).  In addition, the model specification accounts 
for the correlated nature of the error term which arises from the structure 
of the data (i.e., time series for multiple geographic units).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Results are robust to k=1 as well, though we did not have adequate observations to 
estimate a model with k=3	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Results 
The chi-squared statistics for joint significance of the one-year and 
two-year lagged predictors are presented in Table 2.  Not surprisingly 
given our use of annual rates, both violent and property crime rates are 
synchronous (i.e., mutually causal as in case 3 above), as are filed and 
completed foreclosure rates.  More to the point, there are some foreclosure 
- crime relationships for which we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
time-shifted relationship (case 4 above): filed foreclosures and property 
crime; completed foreclosures and violent crime.  Moreover, filed 
foreclosures and violent crime are synchronous (i.e., mutually causal as in 
case 3 above).  However, completed foreclosures lead property crime but 
there is no relationship in the opposite direction (case 1 or 2 above).  It is 
only in this instance that we have unambiguous support for uni-
directional causation.  We therefore have confidence that estimates 
produced by our multilevel growth model of completed foreclosures and 
property crime below will not be seriously biased by endogeneity; we do 
not have similar confidence in the relationship with violent crime and so 
do not estimate a multilevel growth model of it. 
 
Table 2. Time-Shifted (Lead-Lag) Relationships between Foreclosure and Crime Rates, 
Chicago Granger Causality Test Statistics 
 
  Property Crime as outcome 
Violent Crime as 
outcome 
Completed 
Foreclosures as 
outcome 
Filed Foreclosures 
as outcome 
Property crime as 
predictor 
—. 13.30 0.06 3.69 
Violent crime as 
predictor 
19.30 —. 3.16 18.90 
Completed 
foreclosures as 
predictor 
4.95 3.78 —. 25.80 
Filed foreclosures as 
predictor 
2.85 41.40 213.00 —. 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center. Notes: The table is not 
symmetric: rows indicate predictors and columns indicate outcomes. See text for further information regarding 
methods. The test statistics use the chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom; tests that are 
statistically significant at p<.10 (χ2>4.605) are indicated in bold 
 
 
These results may seem curious in light of prior literature examining 
the relationship between crime and foreclosures, where the typical result 
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is a stronger relationship between foreclosures and violent crime than for 
foreclosures and property crime.  However, these results are not 
necessarily contradictory to ours, as our Granger analysis is testing the 
nature of the relationship between the indicators rather than its strength.   
In fact, the mutually-causal nature of the foreclosure-crime relationship 
found here may be an explanation of for the “typical” result – that is, the 
relationship between foreclosures and violent crime is characterized by a 
feedback effect which could appear as a stronger relationship in the uni-
directional tests typically employed. 
How Do Foreclosures Affect Property Crime?  Multilevel 
Growth Model Tests 
Analysis Method 
We specify a multilevel growth model to address this question.  This 
model decomposes the longitudinal trend by specifying it as a function of 
time with two parameters: a starting level and a rate of change.  In 
addition, this method allows for both estimation of overall effects and 
assessment of variation among the neighborhoods. Multilevel models, 
also known as hierarchical linear models (HLM), are generally referred to 
as growth models when applied to longitudinal data.  The basic 
characteristic of these models is the inclusion of random neighborhood 
effects, to account for the influence of neighborhoods on their repeated 
observations.13  These random neighborhood effects indicate the degree of 
variability in the change model main effects that exists within the 
population of neighborhoods, allowing estimation of the distribution of 
the main effects among neighborhoods.  They also help remove potential 
bias due to geographic heterogeneity in unobservables. 
Suppose the outcome of interest (y) is hypothesized to have a linear, 
additive change process, which could be represented as: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The multilevel model random effects are different from the random effects commonly 
used in econometric time series models (sometimes referred to as fixed effects models).  
In the multilevel formulation, the random effects are equivalent to main effects, with the 
descriptor “random” referring to the nature of the neighborhoods (i.e., they are 
theoretically drawn at random from some larger population).  In contrast, the 
econometric random effects describes the effect of individual differences (i.e., random 
disturbance), which is necessary to account for to generate unbiased estimates for the 
main effects.  For an introduction to multilevel models, see Kreft and de Leeuw (1998). 
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𝑦!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝜀!" 
where yit is the level for neighborhood i at time t, xit is the measure of time 
for neighborhood i at time t,  αi and βi are the intercept and slope 
parameters for neighborhood i (i.e., the starting level and amount of 
change per unit change in xit), and εit is the residual (error) for 
neighborhood i.  The intercept and slope are random variables (i.e., the 
random effects), with their variation across neighborhoods modeled as: 𝛼! = 𝛼 + 𝜇!" 
and 𝛽! = 𝛽 + 𝜇!" 
where α and β represent the fixed effects for the intercept and slope 
(somewhat analogous to the mean of the random effects) and µαi and µβi 
represent the random variation of neighborhoods.  Substituting the fixed 
effects equations into the first yields the combined model: 𝑦!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥!" +   𝜇!" + 𝜇!"𝑥!" + 𝜀!" 
To fit this model, two fixed effects (α and β) and four 
variance/covariance parameters are estimated:  the residual variance 
(var(εit)), the slope and intercept variance (var(µαi) and var(µβi)), and the 
covariance between the slope and intercept (cov(µαi, µβi)). The 
variance/covariance parameters indicate the distribution of the main 
effects among the neighborhoods.  𝑦!"#∗ = 𝛿! 𝛼!" + 𝛽!"𝑥!!" + 𝜀!"#! 𝑦!"#∗ = 𝛼!𝛿! + 𝛽!𝛿!𝑥!" +   𝛿!𝜇!" + 𝛿!𝜇!"𝑥!" + 𝛿!𝜀!"!  
Our dependent variable is the annual count of property crimes in 
each neighborhood, regressed on the count of completed foreclosures in 
the previous year, consistent with our Granger causality findings.  Here 
we use counts instead of per 10,000 population rates, as this is a less 
restrictive specification and provides more interpretable results; instead 
population is a control in the model.14  We also include 2000 values of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Modeling the foreclosure-crime relationship using counts rather than rates allows 
coefficients to be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the number of crimes due to 
changes in the number of foreclosures. 
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commercial land area (an indicator of the number of businesses) and 
number of single-family, owner-occupied housing units (an indicator of 
density and collective efficacy) as controls.  Given the distinctive trajectory 
regimes shown in figures 1 and 2, we estimate separate models for each 
neighborhood group, as well as in aggregate.15     
Results 
The multilevel growth model results are shown in Table 3.16, First consider 
the overall findings across all 80 neighborhoods.  As would be expected 
from Figure 1, the overall trend is negative, with the average number of 
property crimes decreasing annually by 50 for neighborhoods with no 
foreclosures in the previous year.  As expected, larger neighborhoods 
have more crimes, but the other controls did not prove predictive. This 
model includes random effects for the neighborhood time trends – in 
effect, estimating separate parameters characterizing the property crime 
time trend in each of the 80 neighborhoods.  As discussed above, the 
random parameters are distributed around the main effects shown in 
Table 3 and their covariance is estimated as a parameter of the model.  For 
the Overall model, the estimated correlation between the random effects 
for the overall trend parameters is -0.674, indicating that neighborhoods 
with larger starting points (i.e., higher property crime levels) have larger 
annual decreases (i.e., more negative annual changes in the number of 
property crimes). 
Table 3 also shows that the impact of lagged completed foreclosures 
on property crime across all Chicago neighborhoods is large and highly 
statistically significant.  Each additional foreclosure in the previous year 
increases the initial number of property crimes by about three-quarters 
and slows the annual decline in property crimes by 0.14.  To put the 
magnitude of these estimates in perspective, consider an archetypical 
Chicago neighborhood with 10,000 people during the 1998-2009 study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Since there are only three or four years (observations) in each period, the model 
specification used only the linear model of change described above. 
16 The control variables, population, commercial land area, and single-family owner-
occupied housing units, were centered prior to entering into the model.  This means that 
the estimated effects for these variables correspond to the effect of deviations from the 
average neighborhood.  For example, the results indicate that neighborhoods with 
population that is greater than average have higher levels of property crime.  It was not 
possible to estimate the effect of the control variables on the rate of change in the number 
of crimes as annual data for these variables were not available. 
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period, evincing the citywide mean number of annual completed 
foreclosures of 229 and property crime level of 546 and annual decline of 
3.35; see Table 1.  Now consider what our model would predict if 
completed foreclosures were to rise annually by one standard deviation 
(297). The initial level of property crime in such a typical neighborhood 
would have been boosted by about 683 (125%) and the annual average 
change would have been an increase of 19 property crimes (compared to a 
decline previously). 
 
 
Table 3. Property Crime-Lagged Completed Foreclosures Multilevel Growth Model 
Results 
 
 Neighborhood Group 
  Overall  I  II  III  IV  V 
Main effects . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Initial level 1724.8  .000 3430.7  .002 1273.3  .000 1571.1  .000 1966.1  .000 2889.7  .000 
 (153.6) . (1083.5) . (208.7) . (176.4) . (286.8) . (310.6) . 
Average annual 
change (54.3) .000 (20.4) .164 (43.6) .000 (63.1) .000 (39.9) .001 (166.1) .000 
 (7.1) . (14.6) . (10.7) . (13.6) . (11.8) . (18.6) . 
Foreclosures#  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Effect on level 2.3  .001 (4.4) .416 1.6  .597 2.8  .011 1.4  .026 15.5  .000 
 (0.621) . (5.4) . (2.9) . (1.1) . (0.624) . (2.6) . 
Effect on rate of 
change 0.076  .048 0.064  .366 0.196  .100 0.121  0.09 0.039  .504 2.9  .000 
 (0.038) . (0.070) . (0.119) . (0.071) . (0.058) . (0.678) . 
Control variables  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Population 0.031  .000 0.099  .001 0.032  .000 0.030  .000 0.047  .001 0.046  .000 
 (0.004) . (0.028) . (0.006) . (0.008) . (0.013) . (0.007) . 
Commercial land 
area 95.2  .295 (83.1) .635 61.5  .372 (294.2) .433 (319.4) .246 906.6  .003 
 (90.3) . (174.0) . (68.5) . (372.3) . (272.6) . (290.9) . 
SF-OO housing 
units 0.037  .241 (0.233) .112 (0.003) .934 0.113  .016 0.122  .460 (0.058) .691 
  (0.031) . (0.146) . (0.034) . (0.045) . (0.164) . (0.145) . 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center. Notes: For the overall 
model, the statistical significance levels shown to the right of the coefficients indicate the probability that the 
estimated coefficients' "true value" is different from zero.  For the neighborhood models, the statistical 
significance levels indicate the probability that the coefficients' "true" value is different from the mean effect 
across all groups.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. SF-OO refers to single-family, owner-occupied 
housing units. # Completed foreclosures for the year prior to year when property crime is measured 
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We think these effects are substantial in magnitude.  Especially 
noteworthy is the impact on the trajectory of property crime, which has 
never before been observed.  Indeed, when our results are contrasted to 
those of the earlier literature, the distinctiveness and value of our 
analytical approach becomes clear.  Note that Immergluck and Smith 
(2006b), Cui (2010), and Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin (2013) did not find a 
statistically strong relationship between foreclosures and the level of 
property crime.  Our contrary results suggest the clear revelatory value of 
applying a multilevel growth modeling approach to this investigation so 
that impacts on crime trajectories can be observed.   
Table 3 also presents results for the model distinguished by 
neighborhood group.  Note that the neighborhood group model was 
parameterized such that the statistical tests for the coefficients (reported in 
the table) are testing whether the effect for the group is different from the 
mean effect (across groups)17.  Substantial differences from the overall 
pattern emerged among neighborhood groups, with the exceptions of 
groups I and IV.  The lack of statistical significance for these groups’ 
coefficient estimates indicates that the effect of lagged completed 
foreclosures on property crime among these neighborhoods was not 
different than the overall effect, not that foreclosures did not affect 
property crime there.  In contrast, the statistically significant coefficient for 
the effect of lagged completed foreclosures on property crime trajectories 
for neighborhoods in Groups II, III and V indicates that each completed 
foreclosure in the previous year slows the decline in property crimes 
among the respective group’s neighborhoods by .27, .31 and 2.4  — 
substantially more than the .14 effect estimated across neighborhoods 
overall.  The group V neighborhoods evinced much stronger effects for 
lagged completed foreclosures on both the level and trajectory of property 
crimes than any other group and the overall set of neighborhoods 
analyzed. 
These results indicate moderation of the effect of completed 
foreclosures on property crime at the neighborhood level.  The effects are 
weakest in moderate income black neighborhoods (Group I) and low 
income neighborhoods (Group IV), and strongest in high income, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This model also includes random effects to represent neighborhood variation in the 
property crime trend;  inclusion of the neighborhood group effects reduced level of 
variation in the random effects and the correlation between the random starting level and 
annual change parameters slightly (correlation: -0.646). 
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predominantly rental neighborhoods; this group is comprised of 
neighborhoods with a range of racial compositions (Group V).  We can 
discern no single metric (income, racial composition, or housing stock 
characteristics) that clearly correlates with these differential impacts; that 
is, it is not a specific characteristic shared by the neighborhoods in each 
group which explain the variation in effects across the neighborhood 
groups.  Thus, we believe that a panoply of factors operates synergistically 
to create this moderation effect, though further research is required to 
identify these factors more precisely.   
Our results counter the conventional wisdom that disadvantaged 
neighborhoods are more vulnerable to foreclosure-induced crime impacts, 
which we suggest might be a product of the interplay of several factors.  
In weaker-market, more-disadvantaged neighborhood contexts (like 
Groups I and IV), foreclosure upsurges may have less-noticeable 
incremental impact on crime for at least three reasons.  First, there likely 
are already a comparatively large number vacant (rental and for-sale) 
dwellings that make for vulnerable targets and facilitating venues for 
various illegal acts, as well as implying fewer capable guardians (Raleigh 
and Galster, 2012).  Second, signs of decay and disorder may abound 
before the foreclosure wave, already signaling no collective efficacy for 
deterring potential offenders.  Thirds, acute economic necessities, stressful 
life circumstances and customs regarding illegal acts may have already 
established a crime-ridden environment in such neighborhoods.  By 
contrast, the stronger impact we observe in areas comprised 
predominantly of renter-occupants in large, multi-unit buildings is 
consistent with the hypothesis that such environs, even if occupied by 
higher-income residents, have fragile collective efficacy.  They might be 
especially vulnerable to foreclosures in their single-family stock that push 
them beyond the threshold into social disorder.  But besides these 
behavioral reasons, weaker apparent property crime impacts in 
disadvantaged and black neighborhoods may also be due to lower 
reporting rates there (Goudriaan, Wittebrood and Nieubeerta, 2006), 
though we note that the evidence here appears to be mixed (cf. Baumer, 
2002).  A final cautionary note: recall that our neighborhoods are 
expansive in scale; results that run counter to the conventional wisdom 
should be replicated with our approach at smaller levels of geography if 
feasible. 
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Conclusions, Caveats and Implications 
We have attempted to contribute to the burgeoning scholarship related to 
home foreclosures and neighborhood crime by employing for the first 
time in this field Granger causality tests and multilevel growth modeling 
with annual data from Chicago.  Use of the Granger causality tests 
enabled the detection and characterization of lead-lag relationships among 
time series with multiple geographic units and reduced the potential for 
bias due endogeneity in the specification of the causal model.  The 
multilevel growth model specification allowed estimation of both main 
(overall) relationships as well as assessment of how the foreclosure-crime 
relationship varied among neighborhoods, both in terms of level and 
trajectory effects.    
We find that completed single-family home foreclosures temporally 
lead property crime and not vice versa, reinforcing our interpretation of the 
model parameters as providing strong evidence of an overall positive 
effect of completed foreclosures on property crime.  In particular, an 
increase in the number of completed foreclosures both increases the level 
of property crime and slows its decline in subsequent years.  The latter 
finding is different from the prior literature’s.  We therefore conclude that 
it is important to consider the effects on both levels and trajectories, since 
the latter implies that even a one-period jump in foreclosures can have 
effects that persist for much longer.  Neighborhood characteristics 
moderate this relationship, likely due to a combination of factors may 
magnify the effects of completed foreclosures (such as weakening 
collective efficacy past its breaking point) and/or perhaps influence 
property crime reporting rates.  Our Granger tests failed to show 
unambiguous, uni-directional causation in the case of violent crime and 
when filed foreclosures were analyzed. 
Before closing we note several limitations of our study.  First is 
potential bias from omitted time-varying variables.  While the random 
effects included in the model parameterization controls for this issue to 
some degree, we did not have access to inter-census indicators of other 
neighborhood conditions besides foreclosures that might predict crime; to 
the extent that such are correlated with foreclosures the estimated 
parameters of the latter variable will be biased.  Second, we did not have 
access to Chicago neighborhood crime data in shorter periods than 
annually.  Such shorter-period data would have allowed us to explore 
temporal patterns in more depth.  Third, we analyzed only foreclosures 
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for single-family dwellings.  The timing and crime-producing effects of 
foreclosures in multi-unit, owner-occupied buildings and in purely rental 
buildings may be quite different.  Fourth, our model overlooked potential 
spatial dependence and heterogeneity of error terms.  Unfortunately, there 
are no available software algorithms for dealing with these spatial issues 
in a multilevel growth model.  However, as the members of each 
neighborhood group are somewhat contiguous, these results do 
incorporate spatial dependence indirectly.  Fifth, this analysis appertains 
only to Chicago and, as such is not necessarily generalizable.  In particular, 
foreclosures in dwellings that were speculatively built in new suburban 
subdivisions (as in California, Nevada and Texas) did not characterize the 
Chicago situation.  Of course, this lack of generality is not unique to our 
study, as all extant work on this topic has relied on one-city case analysis.  
Finally, since this study was conducted as part of a contracted evaluation 
of the New Communities Program, we analyzed neighborhoods specified 
expansively to correspond to the scale of NCP target areas.  We recognize 
that effects that potentially could be found at smaller geographic scales 
might be washed out at this larger scale, leading to Type II errors.  A more 
geographically disaggregated analysis might reveal additional insights 
into the phenomenon under investigation, especially distance-decay 
effects of crime spillovers.   
Despite these limitations, we believe that our innovative application 
of Granger causality tests and multilevel growth modeling to the field of 
neighborhood crime analysis has proven a useful prototype exercise.  Our 
findings add nuance and reinforcement to a rapidly growing literature 
that demonstrates the negative impacts of foreclosures on neighborhood 
crime rates.  This lends further testimony to the voluminous evidence 
about the toll on local housing markets imposed by the United States’ 
latest dalliance with unregulated financial markets (Kingsley, Price and 
Smith 2009; Immergluck, 2011). 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics of Chicago 
Neighborhood Conditions, by Group 
Characteristic 
Neighborhood Group 
All  I  II  III  IV  V 
Population and households       
Population percentage change, 1990-2000 3.6 -5 5.6 20.4 -9.7 13.7 
Population 55+, percentage change 1990-2000 -6.8 11.2 -10.5 -13.3 -12.5 1.2 
Percentage black 42.7 90.9 10.7 8.8 84.2 20.4 
Percentage Hispanic 21 5.3 21 61.4 4.4 12.2 
Percentage foreign-born 18.6 3.6 26.9 37 6.5 13.8 
Percentage less than high school education 29.3 25.3 22 45.7 34.6 13.5 
Percentage unemployed (civilian labor force) 6.8 8.4 3.8 5.8 10.9 4.7 
Percentage poverty 20.9 19.9 10.6 17.4 38.1 16.7 
Percentage household poverty 19.6 18.6 10.1 16.7 36 14.4 
Percentage households public assistance 8.5 11 3.2 5.9 17.1 3.8 
Percentage households with earnings 77.1 76.6 80.7 80.9 67.1 84.8 
Mean household income ($) 49,646 45,908 57,022 45,826 34,491 78,646 
Percentage households single mothers 11.6 15.2 5 9 21.7 4.8 
Percentage moved last five years 57.1 68.7 57.7 56 57 38.8 
Housing units       
Percentage housing units rentals 47.6 36.8 39.1 44.6 63.5 56.6 
Percentage housing units vacant 8.7 7.5 4.2 7 15.6 10 
Percentage housing units multi 2 to 4 31.4 25.8 22.9 51 33.9 22.7 
Percentage housing units multi 5 or more 32.9 15.9 30.4 11.9 49.8 65 
Percentage housing units built in last 5 Years 2.6 0.9 1.7 2 3 8.4 
Housing market       
Single-family home purchase loans (N) 2,313 476 1,830 1,127 1,713 10,471 
Change in number of loans, 1995-2000 74.6 27.9 43.7 9.2 138.2 207 
Single-family home loan mean amount 140 97 155 128 119 232 
Change in mean loan amount, 1995-2000 36 33.5 36.3 34.5 36.8 40.4 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center. Notes: Shown above is the 
mean (average) across neighborhoods for the indicated characteristics. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
reference period for measurement is 2000. 
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Appendix 2. Average Crime and Foreclosure Rates by 
Neighborhood Group, 1998-2009 
 
Crime Rates Foreclosure Rates 
Year Property Violent Filed Completed 
All Neighborhoods 
  1998 708.8 228.2 219.1 135 
1999 647.5 200.9 264.4 195.4 
2000 617.6 191.3 309.9 226.2 
2001 563.1 181.5 410.8 316.8 
2002 549 178.2 560.6 399.4 
2003 547.4 164.7 474.5 382.5 
2004 513.9 151.9 367.1 339.3 
2005 494.8 156.1 229 183 
2006 496.9 154.1 246 86.2 
2007 477.6 150.4 429.3 142.7 
2008 492.3 145.1 475.8 187.7 
2009 446.7 124.6 386.1 155.6 
Neighborhood Group I (13 Neighborhoods) 
  1998 671.3 263.8 214.9 132.4 
1999 622.9 234.9 255.6 181.4 
2000 623.2 238.8 265.2 222.1 
2001 593.7 234.2 362.3 279.1 
2002 582.5 245.2 533.8 376.7 
2003 602 232 500.7 424.6 
2004 583.2 224.1 379.5 386.5 
2005 553.1 228.4 332.8 221.9 
2006 564.3 228.5 395.4 148.6 
2007 573.5 252.6 504.4 191.9 
2008 595.2 239.9 544.3 242.6 
2009 516.9 201 400.4 159.4 
Neighborhood Group II (24 Neighborhoods) 
  1998 379.8 73.4 72 49 
1999 345.7 66.1 92 50.3 
2000 340.9 64.6 88.7 69.1 
2001 312.6 59.8 104 62.1 
2002 314.5 56.6 129.9 77.9 
2003 301.1 54.9 118.9 71.1 
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2004 286.5 51.9 98.8 60.4 
2005 277.7 49.5 70.6 34.2 
2006 264.8 50 93.5 18.9 
2007 256.6 45.5 153 41.6 
2008 283.7 48.2 217.1 70.3 
2009 266.3 42.6 236.3 72.9 
Neighborhood Group III (15 Neighborhoods) 
  1998 493.4 121 150.2 104.4 
1999 463.6 117.2 154.8 116.7 
2000 468.9 117.9 177.1 126 
2001 433.4 117.6 234.9 140.7 
2002 436 117.2 324.6 206.6 
2003 433.2 107 297.7 210.6 
2004 389 93.7 239.3 172.9 
2005 365.3 97.7 139.8 85.9 
2006 366.7 98.4 191.2 43.9 
2007 347.4 89.4 317.1 102.1 
2008 343.2 94.4 489.4 176.3 
2009 339 83.9 516.8 185.5 
Neighborhood Group IV (20 Neighborhoods) 
  1998 899.6 483.4 494.2 291.6 
1999 826 416.4 611.4 486.7 
2000 736.4 376.3 763.4 563.2 
2001 678.5 353.3 1,010.70 876.9 
2002 651.9 338.8 1,407.70 1,061.00 
2003 666.4 309.5 1,143.30 974.4 
2004 618.4 281.7 847 881.5 
2005 617.2 295.3 476.3 465.9 
2006 627.6 285.5 448.9 184.3 
2007 580.5 272.3 924.8 312.3 
2008 579.5 253.4 883 366.9 
2009 520.8 218.5 570.6 278.6 
Neighborhood Group V (8 Neighborhoods) 
  1998 1,684.00 197.7 108.9 63.3 
1999 1,491.60 168.6 133.5 72.7 
2000 1,420.00 169 161.1 49.4 
2001 1,219.80 151.2 240.4 72.1 
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2002 1,153.00 147.4 221.1 108.3 
2003 1,113.70 130.9 157.8 90.9 
2004 1,056.90 118.6 192.1 56.3 
2005 989.1 120.2 84.5 41 
2006 1,000.70 121.5 56.2 21 
2007 971.3 108.9 107.5 17.6 
2008 1,012.10 106.2 96.9 24.2 
2009 890.8 88.2 106.3 34.3 
 
Notes: Crime rates are calculated per 10,000 population; foreclosure rates for single-family properties are 
calculated per 10,000 single-family homes.  For both rates, the denominators were calculated from 2000 
Decennial Census data. Crime data from Chicago Police Department records, assembled by Metro Chicago 
Information Center. 
 
 
